Missed Your 90-Day Tax Court Deadline? The 8th Circuit Just Said the Courthouse Door May Still Be Open - Unless You Live in Florida

For as long as most of us have been practicing, the rule was simple and merciless: you have 90 days from the mailing date on your IRS Notice of Deficiency to file a petition with the U.S. Tax Court. Miss it by one day and the Tax Court would tell you it had no power to hear your case, no excuses, no exceptions, no matter how sympathetic your story.

On August 11, 2026, the Eighth Circuit in Maniktala v. Commissioner, No. 25-1366 (8th Cir. Aug. 11, 2026) told the IRS that is no longer the law, at least in its part of the country.

What Happened to the Maniktalas

Nate and Jaya Maniktala filed joint returns for 2018 and 2019. Nate was a shareholder in BranchPattern, Inc., an S corporation in the building-design business, and the couple claimed research and development credits under Section 41 that flowed through from the company. The IRS examined the credits, decided BPI did not qualify, and mailed the Maniktalas a Notice of Deficiency on December 20, 2023. The notice listed March 19, 2024 as the "last day to file petition with US tax court."

Here is the problem: the Maniktalas did not actually receive the notice until July 9, 2024 — roughly four months after the deadline printed on it had already expired. They filed their Tax Court petition ten days later, on July 19, 2024.

The Tax Court dismissed the case. Not on the merits of the R&D credits, and not because the taxpayers had been careless, but because it concluded it had no jurisdiction to even look at a late petition.

The Eighth Circuit reversed.

The Holding, in Plain English

Writing for a panel that included Judges Gruender and Erickson, Circuit Judge Kelly held two things:

1.       The 90-day deadline in Section 6213(a) is not "jurisdictional." It is what courts call a claim-processing rule — a housekeeping deadline aimed at the taxpayer, not a limit on the Tax Court's power.

2.      Because it is not jurisdictional, the deadline can be equitably tolled — meaning a court can excuse a late filing where the taxpayer was diligent but something extraordinary got in the way.

The court's line is worth quoting: "Filing deadlines . . . are quintessential claim-processing rules. Today we hold the filing deadline in § 6213(a) is no exception."

Why does the distinction matter so much? A jurisdictional defect cannot be waived, cannot be excused, and must be raised by the court on its own. A claim-processing deadline can be forfeited by the government, and it can be tolled.

The Reasoning: Read the Statute Carefully

The Eighth Circuit's analysis follows the Supreme Court's 2022 decision in Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, which held that a similar Tax Court deadline in collection due process cases was not jurisdictional. Congress must "clearly state" that a deadline strips a court of power. Plausible is not enough. Even "better than the alternative" is not enough. It has to be clear.

Look at what Section 6213(a) actually says. The deadline sentence is addressed to the taxpayer: "the taxpayer may file a petition." The only sentence in the subsection that mentions jurisdiction is addressed to the court, and it takes away only two specific powers: "The Tax Court shall have no jurisdiction to enjoin any action or proceeding or order any refund . . . unless a timely petition . . . has been filed."

That structure was fatal to the government's position. Congress plainly knew how to limit the Tax Court's jurisdiction — it did exactly that for injunctions and refunds. It did not do so for the court's core authority to hear an untimely petition.

The Eighth Circuit also had to get around its own 1977 precedent, Andrews v. Commissioner, which had flatly declared the deadline jurisdictional. The panel explained that Andrews contained no actual analysis, and that intervening Supreme Court decisions have undermined that kind of unexplained label. As the Supreme Court has warned, courts "have more than occasionally misused the term 'jurisdictional.'"

The Government's Best Argument — and Why It Lost

The Commissioner made a clever, taxpayer-protective argument. Under Section 7459(d), when the Tax Court dismisses a deficiency petition for any reason other than lack of jurisdiction, the dismissal counts as a decision that the deficiency is exactly what the IRS said it was. That could trigger res judicata and destroy the taxpayer's fallback option of paying the tax and suing for a refund in district court. In other words, the IRS argued that calling the deadline "jurisdictional" actually helps taxpayers.

The court was unmoved. That scenario requires a long chain of events, late petition, dismissal, payment of the deficiency, a refund claim, a denial, and then a refund suit. A "perhaps-unanticipated impact on a limited number of taxpayers" is not the clear congressional statement the law requires.

The Commissioner also argued from history and from the architecture of the tax collection system, contending that Section 6213(a) is itself the implicit source of the Tax Court's deficiency jurisdiction. The panel acknowledged these arguments were serious and not without merit, but again, serious is not the same as clear.

Equitable Tolling Is Available — Not Automatic

Once the deadline was declared nonjurisdictional, a presumption in favor of equitable tolling kicked in under Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs. The government can rebut that presumption only by showing Congress affirmatively intended to bar tolling.

Section 6213(a) does not do that. It contains no express prohibition on tolling, it is directed at the taxpayer rather than the court, it is not written in dense technical terms, and it is not surrounded by an exhaustive list of statutory exceptions. That last point distinguishes the refund limitations period in Section 6511, which the Supreme Court held untollable in United States v. Brockamp precisely because it was so elaborately and repetitively drafted.

Important caveat: the Maniktalas have not won yet. The Eighth Circuit sent the case back to the Tax Court to decide in the first instance whether they qualify for tolling. The taxpayer bears the burden of showing both reasonable diligence and an extraordinary circumstance. Filing ten days after actually receiving the notice is strong evidence of diligence, but the Tax Court gets the first word.

Where the Circuits Now Stand — and Why Florida Clients Should Not Celebrate Yet

This is where it gets genuinely messy, and where geography drives strategy.

Circuit	Deadline jurisdictional?	Equitable tolling available?
2nd — Buller v. Commissioner, 160 F.4th 266 (2025)	No	Yes
3rd — Culp v. Commissioner, 75 F.4th 196 (2023)	No	Yes
6th — Oquendo v. Commissioner, 148 F.4th 820 (2025)	No	Yes
8th — Maniktala (2026)	No	Yes
1st — Kyick Holdings v. Commissioner (Aug. 2026)	No	No
7th — Tilden v. Commissioner, 846 F.3d 882 (2017)	Yes	No
9th — Organic Cannabis Foundation, 962 F.3d 1082 (2020)	Yes	No
11th — Pugsley (1984); Allen (unpublished, post-Boechler)	Yes	No

 

Two features of this landscape deserve attention.

First, the First Circuit has opened a brand-new fault line. Just days after Maniktala, the First Circuit agreed the deadline is nonjurisdictional but held it is nevertheless a mandatory claim-processing rule that is completely immune from equitable tolling, relying on the Supreme Court's 2026 decision in Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel. So the question is no longer just "jurisdictional or not" — it is now a two-step inquiry, and a taxpayer can win step one and still lose everything at step two. That development materially raises the odds of Supreme Court review, which the Court has so far declined to grant.

Second — and this matters directly for our Miami clients — the Eleventh Circuit is still in the "jurisdictional" column. It has pre-Boechler published precedent treating the deadline as jurisdictional, and in an unpublished post-Boechler decision it concluded Boechler did not disturb that precedent. Under the Golsen doctrine, the Tax Court follows the law of the circuit where the case would be appealable. 

For A Florida-Based Taxpayer, That Means A Late Petition Remains, For Now, A Fatal Error.

Practical Takeaways

Do not treat this as permission to relax. The 90-day rule (150 days if the notice is addressed to a person outside the United States) remains the only reliable plan. Equitable tolling is an emergency airbag, not a driving strategy, and the taxpayer's burden is heavy.

Docket from the mailing date, not the delivery date. The Maniktalas' whole ordeal traces to a notice mailed in December that surfaced in July. Calendar every notice the moment it appears, and confirm the "last day to file" stated on the notice.

Keep the envelope, the certified mail tracking, and a record of when you actually received the notice. In a tolling case, proof of the delivery failure and proof of prompt action afterward are the entire ballgame.

Watch your address of record. The IRS is entitled to mail the notice to the address on your most recently filed return. Non-resident clients, clients who have moved, clients using a former CPA's address, and foreign-owned entities are especially exposed. Filing Form 8822 or 8822-B is unglamorous and occasionally decisive.

Know your circuit before you plan. In the Second, Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, a late petition is now worth fighting. In the First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, it currently is not. If you have a client with a potential venue argument, that analysis just became far more valuable.

Preserve the alternative path. Even where tolling is unavailable, the pay-and-sue-for-refund route in district court or the Court of Federal Claims may still exist — and note that the government itself argued in Maniktala that a nonjurisdictional dismissal could jeopardize that route. Preserve both options deliberately rather than by accident.

Received a Notice of Deficiency?

Or Just Discovered One That Has Been Sitting In The Wrong Mailbox For Months The Time To Act Is Immediately,
Not After The 90 Days Have Run.

     Contact the Tax Lawyers at

Marini & Associates, P.A. 

for a FREE Tax HELP Contact us at:
www.TaxAid.com or www.OVDPLaw.com
or Toll Free at 888 8TAXAID (888-882-9243)

If

Sources: 

1. Eighth Circuit opinion in Maniktala v. Commissioner, No. 25-1366 (Aug. 11, 2026),
2. https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/26/08/251366P.pdf; Ed Zollars, CPA, "Equitable Tolling of Tax Court Filing Deadlines," Current Federal Tax Developments (Aug. 11, 2026),
3. https://www.currentfederaltaxdevelopments.com/blog/2026/8/11/equitable-tolling-of-tax-court-filing-deadlines-the-eighth-circuit-joins-the-post-boechler-consensus-in-maniktala-v-commissioner; "Mandatory Limits and the Equitable Tolling Deficit: Analyzing Tax Court Filing Deadlines After Kyick Holdings v. Commissioner," Current Federal Tax Developments (Aug. 18, 2026), 
4. https://www.currentfederaltaxdevelopments.com/blog/2026/8/18/mandatory-limits-and-the-equitable-tolling-deficit-analyzing-tax-court-filing-deadlines-after-kyick-holdings-v-commissioner; Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, "August 17 Tax Policy Update," https://www.sullcrom.com/insights/memo/2026/August/August-17-Tax-Policy-Update; Congressional Research Service, LSB11038,
5. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11038.web.html; "Taxation – Notice – Equitable tolling," Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly (Aug. 19, 2026), https://masslawyersweekly.com/2026/08/19/taxation-notice-equitable-tolling/

IRS Establishes Office of Conservation Easements — and Pulls the Plug on Its Uniform Settlement Letters

On August 19, 2026, the IRS announced in IR-2026-95 that it is standing up a dedicated Office of Conservation Easements and, at the same time, immediately concluding the uniform settlement initiative it had launched barely three months earlier in IR-2026-65 (May 13, 2026).

For the roughly 1,100 conservation easement and historic preservation easement cases still open — approximately 740 docketed in Tax Court and another 400 in Exam (Baker McKenzie) — this is a meaningful change in how, and with whom, these cases get resolved.

What the New Office Will Do

The IRS says the Office was created because conservation and historic preservation easements present "specialized tax, valuation, contractual, and procedural issues." According to the release, the Office will:

• Centralize technical expertise and coordinate policy, enforcement, and case-resolution strategy across the IRS and with the Office of Chief Counsel;
• Support engagement with taxpayers, practitioners, and conservation and historic preservation organizations; and
• Work with Treasury to evaluate administrative and legislative options that advance Congress's conservation objectives, promote consistent tax administration, and "strengthen valuation integrity."

Once operational, the Office will serve as "central coordination and a channel for general inquiries." Contact information is to be announced separately.

Why the IRS Abandoned Uniform Settlement Letters

The candor in the release is worth quoting. The IRS states that experience administering the May initiative, "together with engagement with taxpayers, has shown that standardized, unsolicited settlement letters on a rolling basis, each with a fixed response period, are not well suited to the full range of conservation easement cases."

The reason: "Partnership agreements, insurance arrangements, procedural posture, and other circumstances may differ materially and affect when and how taxpayers evaluate settlement."

Anyone who has actually tried to get a syndicated easement partnership to a vote inside a hard 90-day window will recognize the problem. A one-size-fits-all letter with a non-extendable clock ran headlong into partnership consent provisions, tax matters partner / partnership representative authority questions, and tax-liability insurance carriers with their own approval processes.

The Mechanics of the Transition

Four points matter operationally:

1. No more uniform letters. Effective August 19, 2026, the IRS will not issue additional uniform settlement letters under the May 13 program.
2. Existing deadlines are withdrawn. "Any deadlines for accepting previously issued offers are withdrawn." The 90-day and 45-day clocks on outstanding letters are gone.
3. Prior elections stand. Elections already submitted under the May 13 framework "will remain in effect and will be processed in accordance with their terms."
4. 4. The terms themselves survive on request. Taxpayers with pending cases "may continue to request settlement under the May 13 framework through their assigned IRS examination or Chief Counsel representative." If the case remains eligible, the IRS will issue a new offer on the same standardized terms.

As a reminder, those standardized terms were: full disallowance of the charitable contribution deduction; an "other deduction" roughly equal to the partnership's out-of-pocket costs (often the cash contributions reflected on Schedule M-2); a 10% gross valuation misstatement penalty under §6662(h) (rising to 20% in the secondary window); statutory interest; and no up-front payment requirement, with the liability instead subject to post-settlement collection (Baker McKenzie, Greenberg Traurig).

Do Not Misread This as Leniency

The IRS closed the door on that interpretation in one sentence: "This transition does not signal a new or more favorable standardized offer. Rather, it ends issuance of uniform offers and deadlines."

Individual cases "may continue to be resolved on different terms where warranted by the hazards of litigation" — and the hazards baseline in this program area has been unforgiving: a charitable deduction limited to roughly 5% to 7% of the amount claimed, plus the full 40% gross valuation misstatement penalty.

Recent case law reinforces that the litigation alternative is expensive. In North Donald LA Property, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-19, the Tax Court rejected the Service's 75% civil fraud penalty for failure to carry its clear-and-convincing burden — but still sustained the 40% gross valuation misstatement penalty on a wildly overstated value (JD Supra). Winning on fraud and still absorbing 40% is not a favorable outcome.

Downstream Collection: Who Actually Pays

Practitioners should be clear with investors about where the liability lands under the BBA partnership audit regime (§§ 6221–6241):

• No push-out election under §6226: the partnership itself pays the settled amount. If the partnership cannot pay, investors will receive IRS notices stating the amounts they owe as a result of the settlement adjustments.
• Push-out election made: the partnership must furnish statements to the investors and the IRS describing the adjustments pushed out, and each investor must take those adjustments into account on their own return.

Individual notices generally follow IRS processing after the settlement is reached and the Tax Court decision becomes final (Current Federal Tax Developments).

Practical Takeaways

• Relief from the clock is not relief from the exposure. If you were racing a 90-day or 135-day deadline, that pressure is off — but the arithmetic of settling versus trying the case has not improved.
• Settlement is now affirmative, not reactive. Nobody is going to mail you an offer. If the standardized terms are acceptable, you must request them from the assigned Exam or Chief Counsel representative and confirm continued eligibility.
• Use the pause productively. Obtain partnership consents, resolve partnership representative authority, and get tax-liability insurance carriers aligned now, so that when an offer issues there is no scramble.
• Eligibility exclusions still bite. Cases tried and awaiting opinion, cases on appeal, previously settled cases, and designated test cases (absent bound-case agreement) were outside the May framework and remain problematic.
• Expect centralized, more consistent positions. A single office coordinating with Chief Counsel should reduce inconsistency between examiners — which cuts both ways for taxpayers hoping for a favorable local resolution.
• Watch for what comes next. The Office's mandate to work with Treasury on "administrative and legislative options" and valuation integrity suggests future guidance on appraisal standards is a live possibility.

Have an IRS Conservation Easement Problem?

 Contact the Tax Lawyers at

Marini & Associates, P.A. 

for a FREE Tax HELP Contact us at:
www.TaxAid.com or www.OVDPLaw.com
or Toll Free at 888 8TAXAID (888-882-9243)

IRS Levy Trumps Bid to Recover Seized Bitcoin

A recent Colorado federal district court decision underscores a critical point for taxpayers with seized digital assets: once the IRS levies on the property to satisfy assessed tax, a motion for return of property under the criminal rules is effectively dead on arrival.

In Weeks v. United States, 2026 WL 2263139 (D. Colo. 8/6/2026), the court denied a taxpayer’s request for the return of approximately 8.7 bitcoin seized in an IRS Criminal Investigation search, holding that a later IRS tax levy on those same assets cut off his claim.

Background: Bitcoin Seized, Then Indicted

·         IRS Criminal Investigation agents seized 8.7 bitcoin from Jobadiah Sinclair Weeks during a December 10, 2019 search of his Arvada, Colorado residence.

·         Ten days later, the government indicted Weeks (in a New Jersey case) for conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to offer or sell unregistered securities.

·         In March 2026, Weeks moved for return of the bitcoin under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g), arguing:

o    The indictment contained only boilerplate forfeiture language and did not specifically list the bitcoin, and

o    An AUSA had allegedly told him his “personal property” would be returned (the email did not mention bitcoin).

·         Weeks also asked the court to order a sworn accounting and reconciliation of all seized digital assets.

Weeks’ position was simple: because the indictment did not specifically forfeit the bitcoin, he was entitled to have it back.

Rule 41(g): An Equitable Safety Valve, Not a Back Door

Judge Philip A. Brimmer began by emphasizing that Rule 41(g) is an equitable remedy, not an automatic right. Citing United States v. Bacon, 900 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir.), the court reiterated that a movant must show:

·         Irreparable harm, and

·         No adequate remedy at law.

The Tenth Circuit has long characterized the court’s exercise of jurisdiction under Rule 41 (and its predecessor, Rule 41(e)) as one that should be undertaken with “caution and restraint,” per Matter of Search of Kitty’s E., 905 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir.).

In practice, this makes Rule 41(g) a narrow, discretionary safety valve, especially once other statutory regimes—like the tax levy provisions—come into play.

IRS Levy Changes Everything

The key fact was what happened after the seizure:

·         The IRS served a notice of levy on the FBI, which was still holding the bitcoin, to collect Weeks’ unpaid federal income taxes under IRC § 6331(a).

·         Section 6331 authorizes the Service to levy upon “all property and rights to property” of a taxpayer who neglects or refuses to pay an assessed tax.

Judge Brimmer relied on a consistent line of authority holding that a valid IRS levy forecloses relief under Rule 41(g):

·         United States v. Kahre, 737 F.3d 554 (9th Cir. 2013): Rule 41 offers no relief when seized funds have been applied to tax liabilities pursuant to a notice of levy.

·         United States v. Fitzen, 80 F.3d 387 (9th Cir. 1996): An IRS tax levy defeats a Rule 41(e) motion (the predecessor to Rule 41(g)).

Applying those decisions, the court held that once the IRS properly levied the bitcoin, Weeks no longer had a viable claim to have the property returned under Rule 41(g). Any challenge would need to proceed, if at all, through tax-specific remedies (e.g., contesting the underlying assessment, wrongful levy actions, or refund routes), not via a criminal procedural motion.

No Accounting Remedy Under Rule 41(g)

Weeks also asked the court to compel an accounting and reconciliation of all seized digital assets. The court rejected that request as beyond the scope of Rule 41(g), citing United States v. Riccardi, 857 F. App’x 472 (10th Cir. 2021), which limits Rule 41(g) relief to the return of property.

With no viable Rule 41(g) claim and no authority to order ancillary relief, the court denied the motion and closed the case.

Practical Takeaways for Taxpayers and Advisers

·         Timing matters: Once the IRS levies on seized assets—even crypto held by another agency—the taxpayer’s remedy shifts out of the criminal rules and into the tax collection framework.

·         Rule 41(g) is not a collection defense: It cannot be used to unwind a levy or reroute the IRS’s application of seized assets to tax liabilities.

·         Crypto is just “property” for levy purposes: This case confirms what many practitioners assumed—digital assets held by federal agencies are fully subject to IRC § 6331 levy.

·         Use the right forum: Challenges to the validity of the assessment, the levy, or the IRS’s collection actions belong in the Tax Court (pre-payment), district court (refund or wrongful levy), or through CDP and administrative channels—not Rule 41(g).

For practitioners advising clients whose crypto or other assets have been seized in a criminal investigation, this case is a reminder to coordinate early with both criminal counsel and tax counsel. If there is an existing or looming tax assessment, expect the IRS to use its levy power, and plan your strategy accordingly.

Have IRS Tax Problems?

     Contact the Tax Lawyers at

Marini & Associates, P.A. 

for a FREE Tax HELP Contact us at:
www.TaxAid.com or www.OVDPLaw.com
or Toll Free at 888 8TAXAID (888-882-9243)